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NAOMI R. CAHN*
In regards to abused and neglected children, federal policy has shifted its
emphasis away from efforts to preserve the family unit, and towards efforts to
create new families for these children. This policy shift is reflected in the
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, which allows for simultaneous efforts to
reunite the child with his or herfamily along with efforts to place the child up for
adoption. Professor Cahn argues that placing such an emphasis on adoption will
create situations in which otherwise strong familial bonds are disrupted,
resulting in severe damage to the child. The author argues that it is unwise to
pursue adoption while at the same time pursuing reunifation. Rather, each
child should be cared for with family reunification as the primary goal.
Professor Cahn begins by providing an overview offederal involvement in
foster care. She then discusses some of the problems with the emphasis upon
removing a child from his or her family-since each child's situation is not given
an individual evaluation, one instance of abuse or neglect may result in
permanent damage to an otherwise strong familial relationship. The author
continues by noting that the interests of the child often overlap with the interests
of the parent, even when these interests diverge, policies can be implemented
which benefit both the parents and the child. Finally, Professor Cahn concludes
by suggesting a more humane system offoster care and adoption that would
emphasize family preservation as the preferred solution.
In 1996, Representative Clay Shaw convened hearings on "Barriers to
Adoption." Notwithstanding the title, the hearings focused on barriers to moving
children more quickly out of foster care and into an adoptive family. Witnesses
narrated horror story after horror story about children who had languished in the
foster care system, or who had continued to experience abuse in their families of
origin, rather than being placed out for adoption. These and similar hearings
culminated in the enactment of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997
(ASFA),2 which was designed to promote the adoption of children in foster care,3
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1 Bariers to Adoption: Hearings on S. 104-76 Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources
of the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 104th Cong. 2-5 (1996) [hereinafter Barriers to
Adoption].
2 Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
3 See 42 U.S.C. § 671(c) (Supp. 1111997) (requiring that "reasonable efforts shall be made
to place the child in a timely manner in accordance with the permanency plan, and to complete
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and which amended the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980.
The primary goals of the 1980 Act were to improve the child welfare system,
to provide federal support and oversight for foster care, and to encourage adoption
of children with special needs. By the time of the 1997 legislation, however, these
goals were restated. Although the ASFA reiterates prior law in requiring states to
make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify existing families,4 it places new
emphasis on permanency planning and adoption. Rather than the previous focus
on pursuing reunification before adoption, the new legislation allows for
simultaneous pursuit of "reasonable efforts to place a child for adoption or with a
legal guardian [and] reasonable efforts [to reunify]." 5 Moreover, if reunification
efforts would conflict with a "permanency plan," then the plan takes priority.6 The
legislation also provides incentive payments to states to increase the number of
children adopted out of foster care.7
The 1997 legislation reflects a major shift in federal policy towards abused
and neglected children, and is a dramatic change away from efforts to preserve
families towards efforts to create new families for the children. While it is hard to
argue against increased permanency planning for children,8 at least I am not alone
in this venture in calling for family reunification as the primary goal. Professor
Marsha Garrison has eloquently articulated the tension between meeting "both the
child's need for a stable loving home and the maintenance of his earlier family
ties."9 This Article will discuss the flaws in contemporary federal policy towards
abused and neglected children. Particularly for poor children, who are
whatever steps are necessary to finalize the permanent placement of the child").
4 See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (Supp. Imf 1997). In addition to the exceptions discussed
infra in the text, reasonable efforts are required except when the parent has "subjected the child
to aggravated circumstances," 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i) (Supp. M11 997), or committed
murder or manslaughter, severely abused the child, or has had parental rights terminated for a
sibling. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(ii), (iii) (Supp. I 1997). If the parental rights were
involuntarily terminated for a sibling, the circumstances and timing are irrelevant See 42
U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(iii). The recently released guidelines developed by the Department of
Health and Human Services Working Group on Implementation reiterate that "the most
preferred placement for a child is safe and permanent reunification with the birth parent," and
add that this includes placement with a member of the extended family. Donald N. Duquette et
al., U.S. Dept. Health & Human Servs., Adoption 2002: The President's Initiative in Adoption
and Foster Care: Guidelines for Public Policy and State Legislation Governing Permanence
for Children, at ch.2, pt.1 (last modified June 1999) <http'//www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/cb/
special/02adpt2.htrn#genguide> [hereinafter ADOPTION 2002].
5 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(F) (Supp. 11 1997).
6 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(C) (Supp. I 1997).
7 See 42 U.S.C. § 673(b) (Supp. JI 1997).
8 See generally Mychal L. Feldman, Note, The Child Welfare System and its Implications
on the Best Interests of Children, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 615 (1998) (accusing the child
welfare system of preserving families at the expense of children's interests).
9 Marsha Garrison, Parents'Rights Vs. Children's Interests: The Case of the Foster Child,
22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 371,396 (1996) (emphasis in original).
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disproportionately subjected to the foster care system, the efforts towards
permanency planning may lead to unfair and untimely disruptions of their
relationships with their parents.
The most recent debate over the federal approach to abuse and neglect has
been framed around children's rights to safety, with the implicit assumption that
past policies have returned them to their unsafe families of origin.10 Children's
rights to grow up in a safe environment should continue, of course, to be central
to any reforms in the abuse and neglect system. But those rights must be placed in
the context of, first, children's familial interests of maintaining contact with their
parents, siblings, and other relatives, and second, the policies and practices of the
existing child welfare system. Removing children from their families of origin
may disrupt the otherwise strong emotional bonds between family members and
have a particularly severe impact on the child.'"
The policy of child protective services exists on a continuum between child
removal and family preservation.12 The ASFA represents a shift towards child
rescue, and is an overreaction to a perceived bias towards family preservation.
Displacing the continuum by focusing on children in context may result in more
humane child protection practices. Indeed, the historical development of federal
support for foster care over the past century shows shifting priorities between in-
home and out-of-home care, even though prevention is more economically
efficient than removal. The tensions between the two different meanings of the
child welfare system--the welfare system that provides aid to children and the
welfare system that protects children from abuse and neglect-are longstanding.
And the tensions between supporting a child inside her family as opposed to
outside of her family are similarly enduring. This Article advocates a return to a
focus on children as members of an existing family within a larger conmmunity as
the means for grounding the child welfare system. 3 It is thus paradoxical to
pursue reunification with that family and also to pursue adoption. Each
disposition may be appropriate for any particular child at a specific time, but
pursuing both charts an inconsistent course. Emphasizing the child in context
10 In her book on abuse and neglect, Professor Elizabeth Bartholet argues that
"tuderintervention" has been a significant problem, and that "parents who want their children
back have generally been given the benefit of the doubt" ELIZABErH BARTHOLEr, NOBODY'S
CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECr, FOSTER DRIFr, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIvE 99, 105
(1999).
11 See Andre P. Derdeyn, Foster Parent Adoption: The Legal Framework, in THE
PSYCHOLOGY OFADOPTION 332,336-37 (David M. Brodzinsky et al. eds., 1990).
12 See Jane Waldfogel, Rethinking the Paradigm for Child Protection, FUTRE CHILDREN,
Spring 1998, at 104, 108; see generally Megan M. O'Laughlin, Note, A Theory of Relativity:
Kinship Foster Care May Be the Key to Stopping the Pendulum of Terminations Vs.
Reunification, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1427 (1998).
13 This approach was supported by the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act The




should result in more resources for the child's successful return (or even better
yet to prevent removal altogether).
This Article begins with an overview of federal involvement in foster care,
starting with the 1909 White House Conference on Dependent Care, to show the
historical relationship between aid to children and in-home care. Part II then
continues with a discussion of the relationship between poverty and the abuse and
neglect system. Part Ill provides a fuller examination of the implications of the
1997 changes in abuse and neglect policy for poor children. Part IV concludes by
suggesting alternative approaches to the current abuse and neglect system that
will place children in a safe family.
I. FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN FOSTER CARE
On January 25, 1909, President Theodore Roosevelt convened the White
House Conference on the Care of Dependent Children, which had a goal of
formulating policies to care for poor neglected children who were not juvenile
delinquents.14 At the end of the conference, the participants, who included Jane
Addams, Booker T. Washington, and Theodore Dreiser, proposed making
payments to poor parents so that their children could stay at home, rather than be
removed to an orphanage.15 Conference members did not specify the source of
payments, although they advocated private relief.16 Two years after the
conference, Illinois and Missouri adopted mothers' pensions laws, followed soon
thereafter by most other states.17 The mother's pensions laws certainly received
an impetus from the White House Conference,1 8 but they built on Progressive Era
beliefs that idealized motherhood and the family.19 As one of the Progressive Era
14 See MATrHEW A. CRENsON, BUILDING THE INVISIBLE ORPHANAGE: A PREHISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN WELFARE SYSTEM 11 (1998); see also Marsha Garrison, Child Welfare
Decisionmal'ng: In Search of the Least Drastic Alternative, 75 GEO. L.. 1745, 1751 (1987)
(discussing the change in philosophy of the child welfare system at the beginning of the
twentieth century from outside placement to family rehabilitation); Susan Vivian Mangold,
Protection, Privatization, and Profit in the Foster Care System, 60 OIO ST. L.L 1295, 1295-
1301 (1999).
15 See CRENSON, supra note 14, at 11-13. For additional discussion of the historical use of
out-of-home placements, see Roger J.R. Levesque, The Failures of Foster Care Reform:
Revolutionalizing the Most RadicalBlueprint, 6 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 3-4 (1995);
Catherine Ross, Families Without Paradigms Child Poverty and Out-of-Home Placement, 60
OHIO ST. LI. 1249, 1261-88 (1999).
16 See THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS
OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 425 (1992) (quoting PROCEEDINGS OF THE
CONFERENCEONTHE CARE OFDEPENDENT CHILDREN, S. Doc. No. 60-721, at 9-10 (1909)).
17 See SKOcPOL, supra note 16, at 424.
18 See CRENSON, supra note 14, at 262.
19 See SKOCPOL, supra note 16, at 433-34 (noting that women's magazines provided the
ideological groundwork for mothers pension enactments).
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women's magazines explained, mothers' pension provided compensation to
women just as wages provided compensation to men: "[A man] is paid for his
work; she for hers. And she should be paid by those for whom she does it-all the
citizens of the state."20
The mothers' pension movement thus represented an effort not just to
alleviate poverty, but to keep children out of orphanages and foster care.21
Matthew Crenson notes that, as early as the 1860s, orphanages had given money
to families to enable them to care for their children, so that the orphanage would
not become overcrowded 2 The development of foster families seems to have
occurred during the latter part of the nineteenth century as well.23 Other early
twentieth century governmental efforts were similarly designed to promote
maternal care of their children.2 4 The Sheppard-Towner Act,25 which provided
information to mothers-regardless of class-to enable them to raise healthy
children, can also be viewed as an attempt to prevent additional child abuse and
neglect. Beginning with these early mothers' pensions' laws, there has been a
strong link between aid to dependent children and the assumption that this aid
would allow children to be cared for at home, which was the most suitable
environment for them. Similarly, as traced in a fifty year history of the efforts of
the Federal Children's Bureau, child welfare agencies have shifted their focus
from outside placement to maintaining children at home.26
20 See CRENSON, supra note 14, at 264 (quoting William Hard, The Moral Necessity of
State Funds to Mothers, 29 SURVEY 773 (1913). For contemporary echoes of the importance of
state subsidies to mothers, see generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED
MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIErH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 23-33, 228
(1995); EVA FEDER KrITAY, LOVE'S LABOR: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, 'EQUALITY, AND
DEPENDENCY (1999); Catherine Ross & Naomi R. Cahn, Subsidy for Caretaking in Families:
Lessonsfirom Foster Care, 7 AM. U. I GENDER & L. (forthcoming 1999) (discussing these
proposals); Carol Sanger, Separatingfrom Children, 96 COLuM. L. REv. 375 (1996).
21 See CRENSON, supra note 14, at 262; SKOCPOL, supra note 165, at 425 (citing to
CRENSON); Alexia Pappas, Welfare Reform: Child Welfare or the Rhetoric of Responsibility?
45 DUKELJ. 1301, 1304-06 (1996).
22 See CRENSON, supra note 14, at 260.
23 See id. at 28, 313-14 (discussing the practice of boarding out, which enabled the
orphanage to unburden itself of children with disabilities whose care was expensive, as well as
young children who were thought to need family life the most).
24 See SKOCPOL, supra note 16, at 494-97 (discussing the Sheppard-Towner Act).
25 This was also called the Maternity and Infancy Act. See Molly Ladd-Taylor, Why Does
Congress Wish Women and Children to Die?: The Rise and Fall of Public Maternal and Infant
Health Care in The United States, 1921-1929, in WOMEN AND CHILDREN FIRST:
INTERNATIONAL MATERNAL AND INFANT WELFARE, 1870-1945, at 121 (Valerie Fildes, et al.
eds. 1992); see also DOROTHY E. BRADBURY, FIVE DECADES OF ACTION FOR CHILDREN: A
HISTORY OF THE CHILDREN'S BUREAU 23-26 (1962).
26 Dorothy Bradbury mentions field work during the early 1920s on foster home care
agencies, in which the agencies "were moving from a strong emphasis 'on adoptions and free-
home permanent placements' to 'stressing the preservation of family ties."' BRADBURY, supra
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In providing federal aid to dependent children, the government was clearly
attempting to provide support so that children could stay within their families,
when those families were appropriate recipients of aid 7 States developed their
own standards as to which families qualified for aid. Based on the abuse of the
qualification process, in January of 1961, however, the Secretary of Health,
Education and Welfare prohibited states from terminating aid to children if their
homes had been found unsuitable.2 8
So strong was the policy of providing support only for children who lived at
home that, until 1961, a child was ineligible for Aid to Dependent Children
(ADC) unless she was living with her parent or a close relative. A child who had
been removed for abuse and neglect, then, was no longer eligible for aid under the
federal program. In 1961, Congress enacted legislation expanding ADC and
changing its name to Aid to Families with Dependant Children (AFDC). The
legislation was designed to allow children who were needy as a result of the
unemployment of a parent to receive aid. As part of this massive revision to aid
for needy children, Senator Robert S. Kerr of Oklahoma proposed to the Senate
Finance Committee that children removed from their homes for abuse and neglect
pursuant to a court order be eligible for continued federal aid.2 9 Senator Kerr
observed that he had offered this amendment because some state courts might feel
a "psychological barrier" to removing a child from an abusive or neglectful home
because that child would lose federal aid, and become dependent on the state or
locality instead.30 The Finance Committee echoed his concern, explaining that it
was worried that the unavailability of continued federal aid had interfered with
courts acting in the child's best interests;31 prior to the 1961 amendment, the only
federal money available for foster care came from Title V of the Social Security
Act.32
note 25, at 34, 37, 113. She also mentions the shift in emphasis at other times, such as at a 1929
meeting on rural children, and during the years from 1957-62 when states made "real progress
toward a well-rounded child-welfare program." Id. at 34, 113.
27 See Ross & Calm, supra note 20 (forthcoming 1999); see also S. REP. No. 87-165, at 6
(1961) (discussing federal payments to children in unsuitable homes, and noting that "some
States have placed in operation statutes terminating payment when a child's home is found
unsuitable because of the immoral or negligent behavior of the parent").
28 For discussion of the "Flemming Rule," see Pappas, supra note 21, at 1308-09; see also
Levesque, supra note 15, at 13.
29 See generally 87 CONG. REC. S6387 (1961) (statement of Sen. Kerr).
30 See id. at S6387.
31 See id. at S6388 (statement of Sen. Byrd). The foster care amendment originated in the
Senate, and there was no comparable provision in the House's overhaul of ADC. See HR.
CoNF. REP. No. 87-307, at 5 (1961).
32 See S. REP. No. 87-165, at 6-7 (1961). The report explained:
[TJhere are some home environments that are clearly contrary to the best interests of
[dependent] children... Often, however, remedial action on behalf of the child was not
1194 [Vol. 60:1189
INTERESTS INA FAMILIAL CONTEXT
There was relatively little debate over the foster care amendment. The
primary controversies on the Senate floor concerned the availability of continued
federal aid to a child placed in a foster home where she was receiving religious
instruction, as well as the potential federal interference with state foster care
programs. Senator Kerr explained that the federal government was not attempting
to interfere, in any way, with state laws and policies concerning foster care, nor
with intrafamilial relations.33 Instead, he wanted to ensure that courts felt free to
act in the child's best interests without feeling financial constraints. Moreover, the
amendment contemplated only private, state-licensed foster care homes, not
institutional care, and thus religious instruction would not be an issue. 4
Since 1961, the federal government has become increasingly involved with
foster care, and has consistently attempted to influence state foster care programs.
As the population of children in foster care increased dramatically during the
1970s, Congress held hearings on how to manage the crisis.35 In 1980, Congress
removed the federal foster care system from Title IV-A of the Social Security
Act, and established a separate program under Title IV-E through the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act (AACWA). The AACWA attempted to
federalize state foster care programs by establishing comprehensive standards,
and it emphasized the importance of providing reasonable efforts both to prevent
a child from being removed from her family, and to return her to her family.36 It
also regularized federal reimbursements for state-approved foster care.37 Under
the AACWA, states were required to submit a plan to the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HI-IS), which provided that in each case,
"reasonable efforts will be made ... (i) prior to the placement of a child in foster
care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his home, and
possible. We believe that this undesirable situation could be avoided, in many instances, if
assistance under this program were available for the care of the child in a foster family
home when such care is necessary.
While Federal funds available through the child welfare services to States under title
V are used for foster care of children to a limited extent, the bulk of the cost of foster care
is paid from public funds, State or local, or from funds of voluntary agencies. The lack of
financial resources for such care has hindered the development of the most suitable care
for children vho have to be cared for outside their own home.
See id. at 6-7.
33 See generally 87 CoNG. REC. S6387 (1961).
34 See S. REP. No. 87-165, at 6, 16-17 (1961).
35 See Shawn L. Raymond, Note, Where Are the Reasonable Efforts to Enforce the
Reasonable Efforts Requirement?: Monitoring State Compliance Under the Adoption
Assistance and Child WelfareAct of 1980,77 TEX. L. REV. 1235, 1235-36 (1999).
3 6 See Levesque, supra note 15, at 14-15.
37 See S. REP. No. 96-336, at 12 (1979) (eliminating the old federal reimbursements that
ranged from one-third to two-thirds of the cost of foster care, substituting a flat reimbursement
rate of 75%).
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(ii) to make it possible for the child to return to his home. '38 Moreover, in order to
remove a child from her home, states were required to show that the removal
occurred because of a finding that staying in the home would be "contrary to the
welfare of such child" and that reasonable efforts to keep the child at home had
been made.39
Although individuals do not have a right of action against the state agency
responsible for establishing reasonable efforts,4 0 the Department of Health and
Human Services is responsible for overseeing and approving state foster care
programs.
In the hearings that culminated in the 1997 ASFA legislation, witnesses
repeatedly emphasized the problems resulting from the provisions in the 1980 law
that required reasonable efforts be made to reunify troubled families. Witnesses to
the hearings before the House Ways and Means Committee recounted the
physical, emotional, and sexual abuse visited upon children as a result of their
return to the custody of biological parents who suff&ed from substance abuse,
mental illness, or other conflicts that prevented them from assuming full
responsibility for the care of their children. 41 Foster parents and adoptive parents
described their efforts to extricate children from troubled homes, only to face
recalcitrant judges, social workers, and other actors in the foster care system who
enforced compliance with family preservation and reunification policies devised
pursuant to the statutory mandate to make reasonable efforts to reunify families.42
Moreover, the problems resulting from family preservation and reunification
policies were not limited to the abuse inflicted upon children when their
biological families resumed custody. Heads of government agencies, attorneys
who represented children or parents in the foster care system, and prospective
adoptive parents outlined the destabilizing effect of placing children from
troubled families in multiple foster homes, while government or nonprofit
agencies administered services to the parents in order to enable them to
3842 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (Supp. II] 1997). To ensure the implementation of the
reasonable efforts requirement, the state agency was required to develop a case plan for each
child which included a description of the placement and an explanation of its appropriateness,
and a plan to facilitate the return of the child or another permanent placement. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 671(a)(16), 675(1) (Supp. Im 1997).
3 9 See 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(1) (Supp. 11997).
40 See Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347,350 (1992); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2 (1994)
(allowing private actions to enforce state plans, except with respect to the reasonable efforts
requirement).
41 See, e.g., Barriers to Adoption, supra note 1, at 27, 57-64, 65, 85, 119 (statements of
Connie Binsfield, Sister Josephine Murphy, Patricia Warenda; and D. Bruce Levy). On the
floor, House members reiterated these problems. See, e.g., 143 CoNG. REC. H2012, H-2012 to
H2042 (daily ed., Apr. 30,1997) (statements of Reps. Pryce, Camp, and Burton).
42 See Barriers to Adoption, supra note 1, at 74, 128 (statements of Robert Dean and
Patricia Flory); see also id. at 168 (reading of a letter from Hear My Voice).
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successfully reunify with their children 43 To those individuals who testified at the
hearings, the reasonable efforts requirement in the 1980 legislation had been
interpreted by many jurisdictions as a requirement that agencies undertake all
possible efforts to reunify or preserve the family unit, without regard to the
welfare of the children.44
The witnesses at the hearings proposed a number of solutions that could be
incorporated into the 1997 legislation.45 First, many witnesses advocated that
limits be placed upon the amount of time needed to assess the problems within
troubled families and to administer services to these families for the purpose of
family preservation and reunification 4 6 Other witnesses proposed applying a
presumption or an outright ban on reunification in circumstances in which the
biological parents inflicted severe physical or sexual abuse upon the children, or if
the biological parents suffered from chronic substance abuse problems 47 Finally,
some witnesses supported expediting judicial proceedings for the termination of
parental rights and for determining permanent placements for children in
dysfunctional families that did not respond to the rehabilitative services provided
by state and local agencies. 48
The ASFA seeks to prevent children from spending too much time in foster
care, and to promote adoption. To accomplish the first goal of preventing foster
care drift as well as the second goal of freeing up children for adoption, the
ASFA requires, among other things, that a state seek to terminate parental rights
for children who have been in foster care for fifteen out of the previous twenty-
two months.49 It also requires a permanency hearing to be held within twelve
months of a child's entry into foster care,50 in contrast to the AACWA, which
required simply that a "dispositional" hearing be held within eighteen months.51
The permanency plan required by the AFSA must include a schedule for. (1)
returning the child to her parent, if that is an option; (2) placing the child for
adoption and terminating her parents' rights; or (3) referring the child for
permanent placement.52 As an additional method of promoting adoption, the
43 See id. at 46, 65, 99 (statements of Judith Goodhand, Laureen D'Ambra, and Patricia
Warenda).
44 Not everyone agrees on the federal government's bias, however. The director of
Michigan's Social Services Department claims that the federal government did not provide
sufficient support for family preservation efforts. See Rochelle L. Stanfield, Kids on the Block,
28 NATL. J. 247,249 (1996).




49 See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (1997 I Supp.).
50 See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5XC) (1997111 Supp.).
51 See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5XC) (1980) amended by 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (Supp. 1H 1997).
52 See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5XC) (Supp. iU 1997). The House Report explained that the
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legislation authorizes financial incentives of up to $6,000 per child adopted.53
Finally, the Act clarifies that children's safety concerns are the paramount
consideration in any family preservation, foster care, or adoption efforts.
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE RETURN TO REMOVAL
A. Poverty and the Abuse and Neglect System
1. The Relationship Between Poverty and Abuse and Neglect
Historically, there has been a strong link between child abuse and neglect and
poverty.54 Poor and African-American families are disproportionately more likely
to be charged with child neglect.55 Thirty-two percent of the children served by
the child welfare system from March 1, 1993 to February 28, 1994 were African-
American; fifty-seven percent were white, and eleven percent were Hispanic. 56
As discussed infra, African-American children also spend a longer time involved
with the system than do white children. Today, it is 22 times as likely that abuse
or neglect will occur in families with incomes less than $15,000 per year than in
families with incomes greater than $30,000 per year.57 The reasons for this
variation are unclear, although it is clearly not poverty alone that causes abuse;
instead, it appears that poverty interacts with a series of other factors.58
The association is particularly strong for poverty and neglect. Children may
be removed for poverty alone.59 One Illinois study found that almost ten percent
purpose of the change in name from "dispositional" to "permanency" was to "emphasize the
goal of early permanent placements." H.R. REP. No. 105-77, at 13 (1997).
53 See 42 U.S.C. § 673b(d)(1)(A), (B) (Supp. Ill 1997).
54 See generally LINDA GORDON, HEROES OF THEIR OWN LIVES: THE POLITICS AND
HISTORY OF FAMILY VIOLENCE: BOSTON 1880-1960 (1988); ELIZABETH PLECK, Do,ESTc
TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL
TIMES TO THE PRESENT (1987). Poverty was the first basis for terminating parental rights. See
Marsha Garrison, Parents' Rights Vs. Children's Interests: The Case of the Foster Child, 22
N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 371,374 (1996).
55 Bernardine Dohm, Bad Mothers, Good Mothers, and the State: Children on the
Margins, 2 U. CH. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 2 (1995).
56 See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL STUDY OF PROTECrVE,
PREvENTIvE AND REUNIFICATION SERVICES DELIVERED TO CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILES:
FINAL REPORT IX, at 7-2 (1997) [hereinafter NATIONAL STUDY].
57 See Mary B. Lamer et al., Protecting Children from Abuse and Neglect: Analysis and
Recommendations, FUTURE CHILDREN, Spring 1998, at 4, 16 (1998).
58 See Diana J. English, The Extent and Consequences of Child Maltreatment, FUTURE
CHILDREN, Spring 1998, at 39, 47 (asserting that these factors include "unrealistic expectations,
depression, isolation, substance abuse, and domestic violence").
59 See generally Daan Braveman & Sarah Ramsey, When Welfare Ends: Removing
Children from the Homefor Poverty Alone, 70 TEM. L. REV. 447 (1997).
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of children were removed because of "environmental neglect," which is broadly
defined as a lack of adequate food, shelter or clothing60 rather than any deliberate
actions on the part of the parent; and another twelve percent were removed for
lack of supervision. These are resource problems, not the problems of abusive or
neglectful parents. If there is adequate funding for the necessities of life, then
poverty alone will not cause neglect Similarly, if parents received adequate
support for caring for their child, in the forms, for example, of day care or after-
school programs, then this will ameliorate the lack of supervision problem.
A recent study of child abuse in Denver found that children in single-headed,
African-American households were more likely to be reported for abuse than
were white children living in two-parent households who had also been abused.61
Physicians missed child abuse in white children at a rate of about forty percent;
for black children, it was twenty percent 62 There were comparable rates for
single-headed versus two-parent families. I think these studies show that the abuse
and neglect system is not administered even-handedly-and they also show there
is a high correlation with poor families and that system. More than one-third of
the children in New York City's foster care system also receive public welfare.
2. Welfare Law and the Abuse System
The disappearance of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and its
replacement by the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program,
creates more possibilities for poor people to come into contact with child
protective services.63 It is estimated that 3.8 million children will be affected by
the 60-month limit on welfare receipt;64 their parents will become ineligible for
aid sometime early in the new millennium. Their new opportunities for contact
with child protective services result from several sources, such as the following.
First, the welfare to work program requirements might lead to parents leaving
their children unattended because of a lack of good child care.65 Even if they do
60 Kristin Shook, Assessing the Consequences of Welfare Reform for Child Welfare, 2
POVERTY REsEARCH NEws (Joint Ctr. for Poverty Research, Chicago, 1I.), Winter 1998, at 2,
26 (visited Nov. 21, 1999) <http'/wvww.jpr.org/winter98/article2.htil>.
61 See Carole Jenny, et al., Analysis ofMissed Cases ofAbusive Head Trauma, 281 JAMA
621,623 (1999).
62 See id. at 623.
63 See Mark Hardin, Sizing Up the Welfare Act's Impact on Child Protection, 30
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1061, 1068 (1997); see also Braveman & Ramsey, supra note 59, at
448-49; Shook, supra note 60.
64 See GREG J. DUNCAN, ET AL., TIMELmnTsAND WELFARE REFORM: NEW ESTIMATES OF
THE NUMBER AND CHARACrERrIcs OF AFFECTED FAMILIEs 7 (1997).
65 See generally Martha Matthews, Assessing the Effect of Welfare Reform on Child
Welfare, 32 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 395 (1999) (noting that there may be benefits if parents get
good jobs).
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not work, once parents are ineligible for public welfare, they will be unable to
provide food and shelter for their children, leading to the potential for contact with
child protective services.66 Once a child is removed, the requirements of a
reunification plan combined with a work plan may make it difficult for a parent to
comply with both.67 Second, the requirements for drug testing for TANF
applicants may lead families with these problems not to apply for benefits, thus
triggering more poverty, and more contact with the child protection system.
Studies of child abuse and neglect indicate that between one-third and two-thirds
of all substantiated reports involve some form of parental substance abuse.68
Third, with a decrease in the number of families on public assistance, there may
be more voluntary placements in foster care, as parents try to help their children
by placing them elsewhere. 69 The requirement that unmarried teen parents live
with an adult may also cause more interest in inspections of their parents'
houses.70
As this brief survey shows, the abuse and neglect system is integrally tied in
with child poverty, and changes in each system affects the other.
B. Problems with the Adoption Emphasis
The ASFA isolates one important moment in a child's life-the incidence of
abuse or neglect that led to removal-from the child's lifetime relationship with
her parents, her extended family, and her community. As a recent student note
pointed out, the ASFA simply does not allow for individual evaluation of each
6 6 See Peter Edelman, The Role of Government in the Prevention of Violence, 35 Hous. L.
REV. 7, 14-15 (1998) (advocating government actively participating in locating jobs for welfare
recipients to help prevent increases in the number of children who will come into contact with
protective services); see also Nancy A. Wright, Welfare Reform Under the Personal
Responsibility Act: Ending Welfare as We Know It or Governmental Child Abuse?, 25
HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 357, 365-66 (1998) (asserting that welfare policy must include
publicly-funded jobs to enable welfare recipients to achieve economic independence, thereby
preventing the need to remove children from their home into foster care).
67 See generally Matthews, supra note 65.
6 8 See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvs., BLENDING PERSPECTIVES AND
BUILDING COMMON GROUND: A REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND CHILD
PROTECTION 41, 41 (1999) [hereinafter BLENDING PERSPECnVs]; see also B.G. Greg,
Everybody's Children, CIN. ENQUIRER, Feb. 1, 1998, at Al (estimating that about one-half of
children in foster care in the Cincinnati area had parents with some kind of substance abuse
problem).
69 See Hardin, supra note 63, at 1068. Ironically, foster care parents receive more money
than do recipients of public welfare. See Mark E. Courtney, Report V- Welfare Reform and
Child Welfare Services, in CHILD WELFARE IN THE CONTEXT OF WELFARE 'REFORM" 1, 3-4
(Sheila B. Kamerman & Alfred J. Kahn, eds., 1997) (noting that in 1993, the federal
government spent almost $11,000 per child in the foster care system, contrasted with $975 for
every child receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children).
70 See Courtney, supra note 69, at 21.
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child's situation. It overlooks the psychological effects on the child of parental
rights terminations, it does not necessarily ensure that each child will be adopted,
and it assumes that child protective services will always do the right thing.
71
Children may be in foster care because they will never be returned to their
biological parents, but an adoptive placement is unavailable, either because the
agency is attempting to create a basis for family reunification, or because of a lack
of adequate planning and resources. The ASFA, however, does not distinguish
between these situations, and forces children in all settings into adoption and
termination of parental rights.
In order to facilitate adoptions, the ASFA provides for speedier termination
of parental rights through a variety of mechanisms. While these provisions are
eloquent on paper-who doesn't want to prevent foster care drift and ensure
permanency for children?---they are ill-advised in practice. First, the ASFA
assumes that a certain amount of time in foster care means that the parents are,
and will continue to be, unable to care for their children. Once a child has spent
fifteen months out of the prior twenty-two months in foster care, then the state is
required to initiate proceedings for termination of parental rights.72 Such an
assumption is unwarranted under many circumstances. The length of time for
permanency planning, especially because it is not based on any substantive
ground, ignores the relationship between the child and her parents, overlooks the
actual reasons that a child may be in foster care, and is unmoored from any
"reasonable efforts" to return the child to her family.73 States could use the
length-of-time ground even when parents are responding to services, and the child
would like to return home.74 Instead of helping children, terminating parental
71 See O'Laughlin, supra note 12, at 1437-48.
72 There are certain exceptions to this strict time limit, such as when the child is m kinship
care, or where the state has failed to make reasonable efforts. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)(i)-(iii)
(Supp. III 1997). For criticism of these exceptions as failing to place the child's interests first,
see Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: 77ze Promise and Failure of the Adoption
and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REV. 637, 658-61 (1999) (arguing that the
mandatory termination requirements favor the interests of adults in ways that are harmful to the
children).
73 For an excellent discussion of the problems with such statutes, see generally Jennifer
Ayres Hand, Note, Preventing Undue Tenninations: A Critical Evaluation of the Length-of-
Tune-Out-of-Custody Ground for Termination of Parental Rights, 71 N.Y.U. L REV. 1251
(1996). For discussion of the complexities of this ground with respect to incarcerated parents,
see Philip Genty, Permanency Planning in the Context of Parental Incarceration: Legal Issues
and Recommendations, 77 CHIWD WEFARE 543, 551-57 (1998).
74 As Marylee Allen, from the Children's Defense Fund, explained: "Consider a situation,
for example, where a parent has successfully completed substance abuse treatment, has begun
weekend visits with the children, had one child returned and will have the other two children
returned within the next two months." Promotion Adoption: Hearings on H.R. 867 Before the
Subcomm. on Human Resources Comm. on Ways & Means, 105th Cong. 33-34 (1997),
available in 1997 WL 165564 (statement of Marylee Allen, Children's Defense Fund)
[hereinafter Promotion Adoption].
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rights based on length-of-time could be affimatively harmful.75
Second, in implementing ASFA, states have considered, and begun to adopt,
legislation that is particularly punitive to the families of origin. For example, in
Arkansas, the welfare agency can only continue to pursue reunification when the
parent is making "significant measurable progress" under the goals of the case
plan.76 The burden of proving a "genuine, sustainable investment" in completing
the provisions of the case plan and complying with court orders has been placed
on the parent; if she fails to meet her burden, then the agency need not pursue
reunification.7 7 Louisiana legislation requires that the case plan contain
documentation of the "compelling reasons for determining that filing a petition
for termination of parent rights would not be in the best interest of the child."' 78 In
Nevada, a parent's failure to comply substantially with the terms of the
reunification plan within six months of the child's placement is evidence that
could lead to termination of parental rights.79 In North Dakota, a parent who
"fails to make substantial, meaningful efforts to secure treatment for the parent's
addiction... [or] behavior disorder" is deemed to have abandoned her child °80 In
Illinois, although ASFA provides parents with some protection against
termination when the state has failed to provide reasonable efforts, it is the
parents' responsibility to file a motion that requests the court to find that no
reasonable efforts have been made within sixty days of the end of the time period
during which the state is required to make reasonable efforts.81
Some states are grappling with issues involving drug and alcohol use and
treatment concerns.82 The treatment process is often complicated, however,
relapse may even be an integral part of the healing process. As a recent report
from the Department of Health and Human Services explained:
75 See Kathleen A. Bailie, The Other "Neglected" Parties in Child Protective
Proceedings: Parents in Poverty and the Role of the Lauiyers No Represent Them, 66
FORDHAM L. REv. 2285,2293 (1998).
76 S.B. 211, 82nd General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ark. 1999). By contrast, the Washington
state bill simply requires the court to establish where there has been compliance with the case
plan. See S.H.B. 173, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wa. 1999) (reenacting and amending R.C.W.
2633.170(7)(b)iv)).
77 Ark. S.B. 211.
78 H.B. 827 Art. 675(B)(4), 1999 Reg. Sess. (La. 1999) (enacted).
79 See A.B. 158, 70th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 1999) (amending 128.109(l)(B)).
80 S.B. 2171,56th Leg. Assembly (N.D. 1999) (amending 27-20-02(A)).
81 See Cheryl A. DeMichele, Comment, The Illinois Adoption Act: Should a Child's
Length of Tne in Foster Care Measure Parental Unfitness?, 30 LOY. U. On. U. 727, 754,
758(1999).
82 Recently enacted legislation in Montana provides that, in determining whether the
parents are likely to remain unfit and thus unable to care for their child, the court shall consider
use of alcohol or a drug that "affects" the parent's capacity for caring for the child. See H.B.
366,56th Leg, Reg. Sess. (Mont. 1999) (enacted).
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[A]ddiction treatment cannot guarantee lifelong health, although nearly one-third
of clients achieve abstinence from their first treatment attempt. Relapse, often a
part of the recovery process, is always possible and treatable.... [A]ddiction
treatment can reduce the number and duration of relapses, minimize related
problems such as crime and poor overall health, reduce impact of parental
addiction on children, improve the individual's and his or her family's ability to
function in daily life, and strengthen the individual's ability to cope with the next
temptation or craving.
83
Third, ASFA seems to blame the length of time that children stay in foster
care on the inability of their biological parents to pull their lives together,
notwithstanding the massive intervention by social workers seeking to offer the
requisite "reasonable efforts."84 This is highly improbable, in light of the severe
funding shortages and high caseloads of most urban child welfare systems;
families are simply not receiving the services that they need, rather than refusing
to comply with the services that are offered. From 1977-94, the number of
children who received child welfare services decreased by almost fifty percent,
from 1.8 million to 1 million.85 Even where child maltreatment has been
substantiated, approximately forty to sixty percent of these cases receive no
additional services.86 Fewer than ten percent of child welfare agencies are able to
find substance abuse treatment programs for most of their clients within thirty
days.87 Given that the children's case plans inevitably require their parents to get
treatment, the unavailability of programs means that children will remain in foster
care, and reunification will be postponed or become impossible. 88 There is no
requirement for providing additional services to parents and children in order to
facilitate reunification. 89 At the time that Congress was considering the ASFA,
there were lawsuits in almost half of the states because of the inadequacies of
83 BLENDING PERSPECnVES, supra note 68, at 13-14.
84 One recent student note argued, for example, that it was "the abysmal failure of the
policy favoring reunification" rather than the actual number of children in foster care which led
to ASFA. Cristine H. Kim, Note, Putting Reason Back into the Reasonable Efforts Requirement
in ChildAbuse and Neglect Cases, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 287, 294.
85 See Kim, supra note 84, at 300. The lack of resources for child welfare services is
certainly not anew problem. See Garrison, supra note 14, at 1767.
86 See English, supra note 58, at 49.
87 See BLENDING PERSPECTIVES, supra note 68, at 80.
88 See E-mail from Martha Matthews to Naomi Cahn, (Jan 28, 1999) (noting that "there
aren't enough of the services parents need to comply with their reunification plans") (on file
with author).
89 The Children's Defense Fund explained that it was concerned because, "without an
assurance that services will be available to meet the needs of the children and their parents who
come to the attention of the child welfare system that the interests of children will be
jeopardized."Promotion Adoption, supra note 74, at 19.
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their child welfare systems.9°
Judges have enormous discretion in deciding whether the state has met the
reasonable efforts requirement, and rely on the testimony of the underfunded
child welfare workersY In many cases, it is the failure of the child welfare
agency to offer adequate services, rather than the failure of the parents to comply
with reunification efforts, that explains the lack of reasonable efforts.92
Finally, a primary concern of ASFA is increasing the number of children
adopted, with the underlying assumption that children were not being adopted
because their parents' parental rights had not been terminated. As the House
Committee on Ways and Means Report explained:
There seems to be almost universal agreement that adoption is preferable to
foster care and that the nation's children would be well served by a policy that
increases adoption rates....
Inhere seems to be a growing belief that federal statutes, the social work
profession, and the courts sometimes err on the side of protecting the rights of
parents.93
Prior to ASFA, however, only a small percentage of the children eligilble for
adoption were actually adopted.94 While the ASFA has served to increase the
number of children adopted, the problem has not been the number of adoptable
children whose parents' rights had not been terminated; the problem was finding
adoptive parents for these children. To promote adoption, it is unnecessary to
terminate the parental ights of more parents; what is needed is placing the
children already available for adoption more quickly. In his study of the number
of children whose parental rights had been terminated in Michigan and New York
prior to ASFA, Professor Martin Guggenheim found that the number of children
adopted out of foster care failed to keep up with the number of children eligible to
be adopted, and that the total number of children whose parents' right had been
terminated continued to increase.95 He expressed concern about the impact on the
general child welfare system as well as on the child herself of terminating a
child's parental rights without ensuring the availability of a permanent
90 See Bariens to Adoption, supra note 1, at 21 (statement of Rep. George Miller).
9 1 See Kim, supra note 84, at 303; Raymond, supra note 34, at 1263.
92 See Kim, supra note 84, at 306.
93 HR. REP. No. 105-77, at8 (1997).
94 For example in 1995, only 20,000 of the 100,000 children eligible were actually
adopted. See H.R. No. 105-867 § 4 (1997) (statement of Sen. Mike DeWine).
95 See Martin Guggenheim, The Effects ofRecent Trends to Accelerate the Termination of
Parental Rights in Foster Care: An Empirical Analysis in TW States, 29 FAM. LQ. 121,132
(1995). Professor Guggenheim also noted that two earlier studies of the adoption rate of foster
care children produced consistent results. See id. at 132-33 (discussing analysis of Marsha
Garrison in 1980 and those of Margaret Beyer and Wallace Myleniec in 1986).
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placement 96 Moving too quickly to terminate parental rights may often not be in
the child's best interests 9 7
A related danger of this provision is that financially-needy states will move
too quickly to make children available for adoption in order to receive the
incentive bonus.98 There is no corresponding incentive for successful family
reunification.99 In addition, adoption is not always preferable to foster care. As the
legislation recognizes, when children are placed in kinship care, there need be no
rush to adoption. For older children, foster care may provide an appropriate
balance between safety and connection to their families of origin. Where foster
care provides support for reunification, then adoption is certainly not the best
solution. Nonetheless, some have argued that the AFSA is inadequate because it
continues to provide inefficient protection to children, and places too much
emphasis on family preservation. Indeed, Professor Elizabeth Bartholet charges
that various "loopholes" in the AFSA may prevent child protective services from
taking permanent adoptive placements seriously.' 00 Instead, she believes that
children should be removed regardless of whether they are physically safe in their
homes, and that the priority placed on keeping children in their community of
origin is missplaced.10 1 This vision, however, minimizes the relationships of
children to their parents -02 and community.
flU. FAmm S' IDEN TY, CHILDREN'S INTRET
In arguing that the law should respect the integrity of the family unit, I want
to place this concept in the context of children's interests. Of course, in addressing
how best to respect children, there are many different frameworks and many
96 See id. at 133-34; DeMichele, supra note 81, at 727.
97 See generally Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STiAN. L REv.
423 (1983) (commenting that terminating parental visitation rights is unnecessary and may
prove damaging to the adopted child).
98 The Children Defense Fund's Marylee Allen pointed to this as a potential problem See
Promotion Adoption, supra note 74, at 36 (stating that "it is important that the adoption ... be
crafted so that it does not encourage states to move children toward adoption without sufficient
attention being given to whether adoption was the appropriate plan in a particular case").
99 See Encouraging Adoption: Hearing 105-3 Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources
ofthe House Ways & Means Comm., 105th Cong. 6-7 (1997) (statement of Fred H. Wulczyn)
[hereinafter Encouraging Adoption]. One program, which provided a set amount of foster care
payments rather than a per diem reimbursement, resulted in a decrease in the number of
children remaining in foster care. See id at 8-18 (discussing the Home Rebuilder
Demonstration Project in New York City).
100 See BARTHOLET, supra note 10, at 193,204.
101 Seeid at204.
102 But see id at 177 ("It is true that some older children in foster care have developed
meaningful ties with biological parents.") (emphasis added).
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disagreements over where the focus should be.'0 3 Parents can only be defined in
relationship to children. Respecting families does not mean jeopardizing children.
It is not a choice in which we respect either parents or children; their rights
generally do not conflict. Instead of reifying a dichotomy between the interests of
parents and the interests of children, we should recognize that, in most cases, they
overlap significantly.' 0 4 Martha Minow reminds us of the importance of not
basing politics solely on one's identity.105 In this context, it is important to
remember that parents are all children too. 106 General cultural assumptions that
children are best taken care of by their parents serve to respect children's interests.
Respecting "rights for children" requires "concem[ ] about the importance of
connection, care-taking, and social relationships" as well as an acknowledgement
of the "critical role of relationships with adults."107
Even when the interests diverge, however, respecting children's interests and
safety does not mean overlooking adults' interests. Nor should recognizing adults'
interests mean trivializing children's interests. While it is critical to respect
children's rights and relationships, to make decisions that are in their best interest,
and to listen to them, I believe that parents' rights can also be respected without
classifying children as "property" or without ignoring children's actual
interests.108 Whether one recognizes the interests of parents, or the interests of
103 For example, Professor Martha Fineman, of Comell and Columbia Law Schools, has
been holding a series of "difficult conversations" between advocates of children's rights and
women's rights, both of whom hold strong beliefs.
1o4 As discussed in Part DI obviously the most difficult cases do involve conflicts between
parent's and children's rights (and relationships). After the Supreme Court denied certiorari in
Baby Richard v. Kirchner, 514 U.S. 1094 (1995), I recall a discussion on the FEMJR Internet
list in which parents were acting selfishly, without regard to the child's best interests. Some
maintained that the adoptive parents should have arranged visitation between the biological
parents and Richard in order to ease the eventual transition, while others maintained that the
biological parents should have recognized that it was in Richard's best interests to remain with
the adoptive parents.
This discussion shows how language affects our perspective on what constitutes children's
best interests and parental rights. Each set of parents could have phrased its arguments in terms
of the best interests of the child.
105 See generally Martha Minow, Not Only for Myself. Identity, Politics, and Law, 75 OR.
L. REV. 47 (1996).
106 See KrTTAY, supra note 20, at 23 (noting a claim for validity based on having had a
mother).
107 Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children 's
Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 1, 3, 18 (1986).
108 Professor Scott Altman argues that parents, unlike property owners, have duties
towards children; property owners do not have similar obligations with respect to the property
itself See Scott Altman, Should Child Custody Rules Be Fair?, 35 U. LouISVrAL J. FAM. L
325, 350 (1996/1997). He notes: "Children become property not when laws consider other
interests, but when they fail to treat children's needs with the same seriousness as those of other
persons." Id. at 350-51.
1206 (Vol.60:1189
INTERESTS JN A FAMILIAL CONTEXT
children, either view recognizes the needs of both individual and community, of
both autonomy and family.
Parents develop complex emotional and psychological bonds with their
children that should be respected by the law. Even when children do not live with
them, parents can develop significant relationships with their children that benefit
both the parent and the child.109 There is a bond that develops out of parents'
connection to their children which, in turn, becomes part of how the parents
define themselves. They see themselves as parents. This bond can develop in
many different ways, and it does not automatically develop because of biological
connection. 10
Respecting this bond is respecting the emotional connection. It is very
different from giving parents rights because they own their child.1 I I While I agree
that "inchoate possessory right[s]" 1 2 do not entitle a parent to continue to abuse
109 See generally Garrison, supra note 97; Madeleine Kurz The Purchase of Families
into Foster Care: Two Case Studies and the Lessons They Teach, 26 CONN. L REV. 1453
(1994). Even in abusive relationships, there is generally some connection between the child and
her biological parents. See Annette Ruth Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption:
Implications for Collaborative Adoption Lav and Practice, 75 B.U. L REV. 997, 1013-21
(1995); Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child Abuse: A Problem for Feminist Theory, 2 TEX. J.
WoiEN & LAW 75, 76 (1993) (noting that the contemporary understanding of child abuse
tends to look at abusive mothers as mere "perpetrators of abuse"); Susan Brooks, A Family
Systems Paradigm forLegal Decision Making Affecting Child Custody, 6 CORNELL ..1 & PUB.
POL'Y. 1, 11-12 (1996) (discussing a need for a child to maintain a continuous relationship with
his or her "psychological parent"); Candace M. Zierdti, Make New Parents but Keep the Old, 69
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 497,498-99 (1993) (recommending "weak adoptions" for older culdren
in foster care).
110 Thus, for example, lesbian co-parents and step-parents who are biologically related to
the child may be seen by the child as parents. See, eg., Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does
Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children, 78 GEO. LJ. 459,
474-83 (1990). This term, the United States Supreme Court will be considering a case in which
the parents seek to prevent third parties (in this case, grandparents) from visiting pursuant to a
court order. See Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 11, 11 (1999) (granting petition for writ of
certiorari).
111 Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, of course, fathers were awarded custody because
they owned the labor of their children. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVEN G THE HEART W
LAW AND THE FAMILY iN NtrImzm CENTURY AMauCA 235 (1985); MARY ANN MASON,
FROMFATHER'S PROPERTYTO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 1-47 (1994).
112 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, f Babies, Bonding, and Burning Buildings: Discerning
Parenthood in IrrationalAction, 81 VA. L. REV. 2493,2520 (1995).
As critical race scholars have eloquently argued, rights can be useful for disempowered
people. For a discussion of the importance of rights, see, for example, Richard Delgado, The
Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R-
C.L. L. REV. 301, 306-07 (1987); Man J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Cn-tical Legal
Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323, 357 (1987) Patricia I. Williams,
Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.-C.L L
REV. 401,432-33 (1987).
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her child, I do not think that notions of children as property are what is underlying
removal of abused and neglected children. Instead, I believe that children are too
often removed without an adequate examination of their biological parent' means
for support. Such examination is necessary so that children's lives are minimally
disrupted. We may use the legal ternifiology of "rights" to justify recognizing
these relationships, but legal terminology is merely the method for phrasing a
nonlegal emotion.1 13
There can be no safe presumption that parents will always want only what is
best for their children, although this remains a good working hypothesis. 14 An
abusive mother who wants custody of her daughter creates a very dangerous
situation.115 In the short term, contact would be harmful. In the long term,
however, (and depending on the nature of the abuse, of course) the mother's
wishes could be partially accommodated through carefully structured visitation
that protects the daughter. The mother has some affective interest that differs from
a property right in maintaining contact with her child, and the child often has
some affective interest in maintaining contact with his or her mother.116 If the
Moreover, in this context at least, the concept of rights allows us to recognize the
relationship at issue. See Minow, supra note 107, at 6; see generally Catherine J. Ross, From
Vulnerability to Voice:. Appointing Counsel for Children in a Civil Context, 64 FORDHAM LR
1571 (1996) (using a discussion of rights to argue that children should be appointed counsel in
civil litigation).
Katherine Federle argues that to truly respect children's rights, we must treat the children
as parties to any dispute that affects them, and, to ensure adequate representation, appoint them
counsel. She believes, for example, that children must approve any custodial outcome that
affects them. See Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places:
Resolving Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 CARDOZO L REV. 1523, 1564 (1994).
113 As Professor Bartlett points out: "If we have to choose between children and adults,
we may prefer to be a society which puts the child's interests first, but our larger concern is how
the interests of both parent and child link together in relationships." Katherine T. Bartlett, Re-
Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE Li. 293, 304 (1988); see also Katherine K. Baker, Property
Rules Meet Feminist Needs: Respecting Autonomy by Valuing Convention, 59 OHiO ST. L.
1523, 1578 (1998) (noting that the conception of property is based on relations between
people); Karen Czapanskiy, Grandparents, Parents and Grandcildren, 26 CoNN. L REV.
1315, 1361-63 (1994) (discussing how not to privilege the interests of grandparents, parents,
and grandchildren over each other and, instead, to respect their interdependent relationships).
114 See Martha Albertson Fineman, What Role for Family Privacy? 68 GEO. WASI. U.L
REV. (forthcoming 1999). As Professor Jane C. Murphy points out, the abuse and neglect
system too often presumes that mothers and children are adversaries. See generally Jane C.
Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from Welfare "Reform,"
Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 688 (1998).
115 See generally Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of
Domestic Violence on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1041 (199 1).
1161 saw this frequently while representing parents of abused and neglected children, see
Marie Ashe & Naomi R Calm, supra note 109, and in my work representing victims of
domestic violence. For further discussion of the importance of contact between parents and
children, even in child abuse and neglect situations, see Altman, supra note 108.
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mother nonetheless attempts to continue the abuse, then she clearly should not be
allowed continued access to her child.
Even in such a situation, I believe it is important to recognize the mother's
interests. These interests arise from her prior relationship to the child (not her
biological connection), as well as from her own sense of identity, which includes
a notion of herself as the mother.
When parents divorce, we accord the noncustodial parent visitation rights,
even at the potential expense of the child's best interests.117 1 believe that we do
this in recognition of the noncustodial parent's relationship to his child. Even
though some of our most influential child psychologists argue to the contrary,
courts believe that two parents are best for every child.1 18 1 think that we have
such a deeply held belief, in part, because we want to find some way of granting
the noncustodial parent some '"ights" in her child.
The child's best interests are not unmoored from the identity of her "parents."
State statutes require that the parents' wishes be considered in child custody
litigation. The parents' wishes are not determinative, nor should they be. But a
custody standard that did not consider how the parents feel about their child
would be a travesty.
Assuming that the parents want to retain custody of the child because she is
their "property" demeaips the conception of parenthood. So does removing a child
from a familial situation because of the neglect that results from poverty. The
dichotomy between "child-centered" law, which focuses solely on children's best
interests, without deference to the parents, and "children as property" law, which
focuses only on to whom the children belong, is false.119 Advocates of a "child-
centered" focus bring critical attention to issues concerning children by forcing us
to listen to children and attend to their needs. While it is somewhat harder to
defend the "children as property" perspective, I think it suggests that parents have
rights that must be respected. These positions exist on a continuum, and child
welfare policy should respect the interdependent nature of the rights of children
and parents. 120 Children generally need their parents, and their parents depend on
117 See Garrison, supra note 9, at 379-80; cf JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, Er AL, IN THE BEST
INTERESTs OF THE CHILD (1986) (arguing that a child needs continuity of caretaking and bonds
with one psychological parent). But see inffra note 118.
llS See generally GOLDSTEIN Er AL, supra note 118. Professor Ira C. Lupu argues that
two parents provide a model of family governance. See generally Ira C. Lupu, The Separation
ofPowers and the Protection of Children, 61 U. Cm. L. REV. 1317 (1994).
119 See generally Martha Minow & Mary Lyndon Shanley, Relational Rights and
Responsibilities: Revisioning the Family in Political Theory, I 1 HYPATIA 4 (1996).
120 See Annette Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender. Race, and
Class in the Child Protection System, 48 S.C.L. REv. 577, 610 (1997). Professor Appell
advocates that the abuse and neglect system focus on the parent-child relationship, rather than
using either a parent-focused or child-focused inquiry. This standard for intervention would not
examine the behavior or morals of the caretaker, but rather her functioning as a parnt. See id. at
611.
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support from others.1 21
Moreover, a sole focus on parent or child, or even a focus solely on the
parent/child relationship, overlooks the child as a member of a family and a
community. A family includes not just parent(s) and a child, but also siblings,
grandparents, and other relatives. In determining removal, foster care placement,
reunification, and adoption, the child's interests must include a consideration of
her relationships with these other people. 122 Looking at children in context
considers their relationships to parents, siblings, and other relatives. While this
has led to increased use of kinship care, it should also result in fewer removals
and more emphasis on reunification.
The goal of permanence, of getting children out of the limbo of foster care,
has enormous symbolic value. Adoption symbolizes a complete change in a
child's family structure. The rights of her biological parents are terminated, and
she receives a new birth certificate that reflects her adoptive family as her birth
family. All ties with her family of origin are severed and she is able to begin a
new life.123 Yet, "[o]utside the child welfare system, our legal tradition has
generally accepted the premise that parents have a paramount claim to the care
and custody of their minor children." 124 Our protection of the family through
notions such as family privacy and integrity has, however, depended on the class
of the family.' 25 Wealthier families have always received more protection for
121 For a graceful articulation of interdependency theory, see generally Karen Czapanskiy,
Interdependencies, Families, and Children, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 957 (1999). Professor
Czapanskiy explains:
[A] proposed legal intervention is acceptable only when it supports caregivers in
maximizing their ability to care for a child... Interdependency theory assuies ... that
the caregiver stands at the threshold between a child and society. Society is dependent on
the caregiver to care for the young child; thus what society can do best for the child is to
support the caregiver.
Id. at 958, 967.
122 See Adoption of Hugo, 694 N.E.2d 377, 379-80 (Mass. 1998), cert. denied, Hugo P.
v. George P., 119 S. Ct. 1286 (1999) (upholding sibling separation notwithstanding importance
of that relationship). As professors Martha Minow and Mary Lyndon Shanley point out, family
members are individuals, but they are individuals who are in part defined by their relationships
with others." Minow & Shanley, supra note 119, at 5.
123 See 1 JOAN HEETZ HOLUNGER, ADOPTiON LAW AND PRACnCE, at I- I (Joan Heifetz
Hollinger et al. eds., 1999); Naomi R. Cahn & Jana Singer, Adoption, Identity, and the
Constitution: The Case for Opening Records, 2 U. PA. CoNsT. Li. (forthcoming 1999).
Professor Bartholet has argued that the adoption solution continues to be overlooked; see
genera *, BARTHOLET, supra note 10.
124 Garrison, supra note 14, at 1769.
125 See Michael Grossberg, Some Queries About Privacy and Constitutional Rights, 41
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 857, 860 (1991) (discussing the class-based nature of Wyman v. James,
400 U.S. 309 (1971)). Professor Grossberg argues, more generally, that 'Ip]rivacy rights have
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their familial based decisionmaking, as the very history of public welfare to
children shows. 126 As discussed earlier, the history of aid to poor women is
replete with attempts to control their lives by conditioning public welfare on their
compliance with morality requirements that involve state supervision of their
lives. 127 As Jacobus tenBroek originally pointed out thirty years ago,
[W]e have two systems of family law... One is public, the other private. One
deals with expenditure and conservation of public funds and is heavily political
and measurably penal. The other deals with the distribution of family flmds,
focuses on the rights and responsibilities of family members, and is civil,
nonpolitical, and less penal. One is for underprivileged and deprived families; the
other for the more comfortable and fortunate. 12
8
This two-tiered model pervades every aspect of family law as a result of, first,
the different laws that apply to rich and poor, second, the differential
administration of any applicable law, 129 and third, the different patterns of usage
of existing laws which seem affected by class. In the foster care system, this dual
system is transparently clear;, federal funds are not even available for foster care
for children who are not eligible for public aid. Abuse within wealthier families is
simply not subject to the same level of scrutiny. ' 30
never been uniformly granted but have varied according to age, sex, race, marital status,
political beliefs, religious practices, and residence." Id. at 862. And Professor Martha Fineman
has queried why single mothers, particularly poor and divorced mothers, were excluded from
the protections of privacy. See FINEMAN, supra note 20, at 180.
126 See generally Naomi R Cahn, Representing Race Outside of Explicitly Racialized
Contexts, 95 MIcH. L. REv. 965 (1997); Catherine J. Ross & Naomi R. Calm, Subsidy for
Caretaking in Families: Lessons from Foster Care, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER & L (forthcoming
1999); Lucy A. Williams, 77Te Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare Reform
Proposals, 102 YALE Li. 719 (1992). For one of the most famous articulations of this concept,
see generally Jacobus tenBroek, California s Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin,
Development, and Present Status (pts. I-iI), 16 STAN. L. REV. 257 (1964); 16 STAN. L REV.
900 (1964); 17 STAN. L. REV. 614 (1965).
127 This was true, regardless of the type of "aid" these mothers received. See GORDON,
supra note 54, at 82 (1988) (noting attempts to impose middle-class norms on poor women who
were victims of domestic abuse).
128 See Jacobus tenBroek, Californias Dual System of Family Lav: Its Origin.
Developmen andPresent Status (pL 1), 16 STAN. L. REV. 257, 257-58 (1964).
12 9 See Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor
Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 HoFsRA L. REV. 533,540 (1992) (explaining that judges
grant judgment to the landlords when neither side produces evidence, and that this phenomenon
goes beyond the applicable statute).
130 See generally Beverly Horsburgh, Lifting the Veil of Secrecy: Domestic Violence in the
Jewish Community, 18 HARV. WOMEN's LJ. 171 (1995) (discussing the little attention given to
Jewish battered women); Ross & Cahn, supra note 20 (forthcoming 1999).
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Given the number of children who are removed for poverty alone, a sole
emphasis on best interest of the child leads to class and race bias. Instead, children
must be viewed in their familial contexts-their relationships to their siblings,
parents, relatives and community-and must be supported in this context
Removing a child from her family disrupts all of these relationships. While
removal can certainly be justified where there is severe abuse or where the child
will not be safe, for most families, there are means short of long-term removal
that will provide benefits to the child.
This is particularly Irue for African-American children, whose foster care
placement rate is twice as high as that of white children. An overwhelming
majority of white children-seventy-two percent-in the abuse and neglect
system received in-home services, while only forty-four percent of African-
American children received in-home services. I The dimensions of this disparity
do not reflect differences in the population of children referred to the child
welfare system. As the Department of Health and Human Services concluded,
"even when families have the same characteristics and lack of problems, African-
American children, and Hispanic children to a lesser extent, are more likely than
white children to be placed in foster care.'132 In addition, African-American
children spend more time in foster care than do white children. 133 The
disproportionate representation of poor and African-American children in the
abuse and neglect system show that something other than the need for more
permanency is wrong with the system.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR MORE HUMANE IMPLEMENTATION! 
34
Placing children in a relational context requires careful thinking about
alternatives to traditional foster care and adoption, acknowledging both the
importance of preserving the family and removing the child when the family is
unsafe. One comparatively recent innovation has been an increasing use of
kinship care, allowing relatives rather than strangers to care for children after
removal.' 35 While this allows a child to maintain connections with her family, it
131 See NATIONAL STUDY, supra note 56, at 6-3. The placement rate for Hispanic children
was 40%, while the in-home service rate was 60%.
13 2 NATIONAL STUDY, supra note 56, at 7-22.
13 3 See i. at 7-16 (observing that the length of time was "32.9 months for African-
American versus 18 months for white in kinship placement, and 27.2 months for African-
American and 19.1 months for whites in non-kinship placement").
134 Family preservation costs $4,500 per year, while foster care is S17,500. See Stanfield
supra note 44, at 250 (citing the Center for Study of Social Policy and Change).
135 Under 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(19) (Supp. II 1997), which was enacted as part of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, states must now
consider giving preference to adult relatives over unrelated care providers.
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attempts to ensure the safety of her familial placement 136 Others have suggested
changing the standard for intervention such that child protection authorities could
not remove children unless placement in foster care would be more effective than
remaining in the home situation. Such a proposal grapples with the inadequacies
of foster care as well as the benefits of maintaining a child's family of origin.137
An additional protection, which would be particularly helpful for poor families,
would mandate court-appointed counsel for all parents involved with the abuse
and neglect system from the initial suspicion of neglect through all subsequent
proceedings. 138 In addition, there are many mechanisms that keep children safe
without terminating their familial ties.
There are a series of different strategies that states, localities, and nonprofits
can undertake both before a child is removed and then afterwards to encourage
reunification. These strategies do not necessarily involve the expenditure of more
state and federal money on abused or neglected children. Instead, they involve a
reallocation of existing resources. Given the disparities between the amount of
money expended when a child remains in her home as opposed to being placed in
foster care, maintaining in-home placements could be supported without
additional money. Spending the money well before a child is removed, at the time
of initial identification of risk, could prevent escalation of the abuse or neglect as
well as a foster care placement
In considering changes to abuse and neglect services, it is critical to eliminate
race-based disparities throughout the system. That is, of course, an extremely
difficult premise to implement given contemporary culture.139 Using more
community-based interventions may be one effective method of distilling the
racism that seems to pervade the abuse and neglect system; in addition, child
welfare agencies need training and monitoring on these issues.
A.Pre-Removal
The federal government allocates less than five percent of its child protective
services budget to family preservation, while the remainder is spent on foster
136 Of course kinship care is not perfect. It is unclear whether kinship care is formalized
familial care, or is, instead, a conventional foster care placement This confusion is mirrored in
policies surrounding such care. See Jill Duerr Berick, Wen Children Cannot Remain Home:
Foster Family Care and Kinship Care, FuiRE CHaDREN, Spring 1998 at 72, 84. Foster care
pays more than public welfare. See Laurie Hanson & Irene Opsahl, Kinship Caregiving: Lav
md Policy, 30 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 481, 483 (1996). Reunification occurs more slowly in
kinship care than in other types of foster care. One reason may be the financial incentives to
keep children in familial care rather than returning them. See Berrick, supra, at 82-83.
13 7 See Braveman & Ramsey, supra note 59, at 463; Kay P. Kindred, Reconciling Child
Welfare and Welfare Reform: Making the Case for Reform of Child Protection Policy and
Practice 39 (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
138 See Kathleen A. Bailie, supra note 75, at 2285 (1998).
139 See generally DOROTHY ROBERTs, KILLING TE BLACK BODY (1997).
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care.14 Although both the AACWA and ASFA mandate intensive pre-placement
services, federal funding for child welfare remains grossly skewed in favor of
subsidizing foster care rather than preventive programs. While the number of
children in foster care has remained constant, the number of children receiving in-
home services declined from 1,244,400 in 1977 to 497,000 in 1994.141
Given the relationship between poverty and neglect, more public welfare
funds and better support for poor working parents142 might obviate the need for
any involvement with the abuse and neglect system.. There are many kinds of
other interventions before a child is removed that may be effective in preventing
her removal, ranging from parenting classes to home visiting, to helping parents
find housing and jobs, to coordinating public welfare services and domestic
violence interventions with the child welfare system, to providing more intensive
substance abuse programs.
1. The Child Protection Agency
Child welfare agencies are charged with a variety of tasks. They are
frequently underfunded and understaffed. In 1996, child welfare agencies in
twenty-one states were subject to court supervision based on their failures with
respect to the child abuse and neglect systems. 143 For example, the foster care
system in the District of Columbia has been in court-ordered receivership since
1995.144 The New York City foster care system has been under legal attack for its
failure to protect children.145 A recent report on the New York system found
various continuing problems.' 46 The lack of funding affects not only the
operations of a child protection agency, but also their ability to offer the needed
services.147
14 0 See Courtney, supra note 69, at 13. Roger Levesque shows how the AACWA has
created incentives for foster care, rather than preventive services. See Levesque, supra note 15,
at 19; see also Gordon, supra note 72, at 664-65. Levesque also discusses how even the limited
focus on prevention served to prevent attention being given to postreunification efforts to
maintain the family. See Levesque, supra note 15, at 19.
141 See NATIONAL STUDY, supra note 56, at 8-2. The number of children in foster care in
1977 was 543,000, and it declined slightly to 502,000 in 1994. See id.
142 See generally HARD LABOR: WOMEN AND WORK IN THE POST-WEFAME ERA (Joel F.
Handler & Lucie White eds, 1999).
143 See Robert Pear, Many States Fail to Fulfill Child lelfare, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17,
1996, at 1.
144 See generally LaShawn v. Kelly, 887 F. Supp. 297 (D.C. 1995).
145 Seegenerally Marisol v. Giuliani, 924 F. Supp. 662 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (class
certification), aff'd 126 F.3d 372 (2d. Cir. 1997).
146 See Rachel Swarms, Panel Says Agency Lags Is Assessing Children's Needs, N.Y.
Tvis, May 22,1999, at B4.
147 See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text (discussing these funding problems).
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Professor Leroy Pelton has suggested restructuring the child protective
services agency to focus on children's issues, rather than on investigative and
law-enforcement processes.' 48 Such a restructuring might make clients more
comfortable seeking and accepting preservation services if they know they are
getting help, rather than making themselves subject to a high risk of child
removal. 149 Several states have implemented screening programs in which the
child welfare agency investigates only the most severe cases of alleged abuse and
neglect, while other cases are referred for family assessment and support.1
50
2. Emphasizing Community Involvement
States are also experimenting with more community involvement, such as
working with local community centers, to provide better,. and more targeted,
services.151 For example, the District of Columbia recently received money from
the federal Department of Health and Human Services to hire four people to work
with community collaboratives, which include community residents and local
service providers, in an effort to prevent removal as well as to improve
permanency.152 Community centers that provide support for parenting could also
offer health care, child care and more general monitoring. 153 The whole concept
of kinship care builds upon the strength of the child's extended community.15
148 See generaly Leroy H. Pelton, Child Welfare Policy and Practice: The Myth of
Family Preservation, 67 Am. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 545 (1997); Leroy H. Pelton, Enabling
Public Child Welfare Agencies to Promote Family Preservation, 38 Soc. WORK 491 (1993)
[hereinafter Enabling]; Leroy H. Pelton, Welfare Discrimination and Child Welfare, 60 OHIo
ST. LJ. 1479 (1999).
149 See Pelton, Enabling, supra note 148, at 492.
150 See Waldfogel, supra note 12, at 112-114 (discussing efforts of Missouri and Florida).
In Florida, a preliminary evaluation of the project found better safety outcomes for children
involved in the new system. See id. at 114.
151 See id at 115-16 (discussing Iowa's Patch Program).
152 See HHS Approves Child Welfare Demonstration for the District of Columbia, U.S.
Newswire, July 22,1999, available in 1999 WL 22280690.
153 See Lucie White, Quality Child Care for Low-Income Families: Despair. Impasse
Improvisation, in HARD LABOR: WOMEN AND WORK IN THE POST-WELFARE ERA, supra note
142, at 116, 136.
154 See Madeline L. Kurtz, The Purchase of Families Mito Foster Care: Tv Case Stidies
and the Lessons They Teach, 26 CoNN. L. REv. 1453, 1453-58 (1994).
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3. Early Prevention Efforts
Trying to prevent abuse and neglect from occurring in the first place is a
critical priority. Other possibilities involve "home visiting,"'155 which provides
prevention at an early stage, if families can be identified early enough. 156 Home
visits can even begin during a woman's pregnancy. For example, if a sibling has
already been placed in foster care, home visiting for a new mother might provide
security and stability for a new baby so the baby can remain with the author and
so the sibling can be returned. Home visiting includes a range of programs -hat
equip individual 'visitors' with information about pregnancy, infant needs, child
development, nutrition, and parenting tasks" so that they can develop an ongoing
relationship with pregnant women or new parents.157 The visits may continue for
several years. Other programs offered as part of home visiting could provide
ongoing education and support to parents of young children.t 58 Evaluations of
home visiting programs show that they are effective at reducing child abuse
compared to control groups who did not receive this type of intervention. 159
Home visiting programs can also promote contact with other supportive resources
that will strengthen parenting. 160
Although there are legitimate fears based on the historical misuse of home
visiting as to the potential for overly zealous intervention with respect to
recipients, 161 it is possible to develop programs that are sensitive to culture and
155 See Martha Minow, Learningfrom Experience: The Impact of Research About Family
Support Programs on Public Policy, 143 U. PA. L REV. 221, 222 (1994); see also Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse, Home Visiting and Family Values: The Powers of Convesanon,
Touching, and Soap, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 253, 262 (1994) (discssing the benefits that the
author, currently a professor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, received from a
"visiting nurse' as a new mother in 1969); see generally Home Visiting, 3 FUIJRE CHILDREN,
Spring 1993, at 1, 4-214 (devoting the entire issue to home visiing); Home Visiting: Recent
Program Evaluations, 9 FUTURE CHILDREN, Spring/Summer 1999, at 1, 1-223 (same).
156 See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Poor Mothers, Poor Babies: Law, Medicine, and
Crack, in CHILD, PARENT, AND STATE: LAW AND POuCY READER I I 1 (Randall Humm et a].
eds., 1994). Poor black women, who are among those most likely to need prenatal care, are
among those least likely to receive it. See Woodhouse, supra note 155, at 255-56. Home visits
can begin shortly after the baby is born.
157 See Minow, supra note 155, at 222.
158 See Naomi R. Cahn, Pragmatic Questions About Parental Liability Statutes, 1996
Wisc. L. REV. 399,432.
159 See generally Home Visiting, 3 FLURE CHILDREN, Spring 1993, at 1, 4-214 (devoting
the entire issue to home visiting); Home Visiting: Recent Program Evaluations, 9 FUTURE
CHILDREN, Spring/Summer 1999, at 1, 1-223 (same).
160 See Gregory A. Loken, "Throwaivay" Children and Throwavay Parenthood, 68
TEMP. L. REv. 1715, 1758-59 (1995).
161 See generally Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (upholding state AFDC
requirement of home visit over objections of welfare recipient). Home visits may serve many
purposes other than providing support. See BARTHOLErsupra note 10, at 65-68.
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that provide support to families, rather than frther legal involvement. Professor
Martha Minow suggests that local communities work with social scientists to plan
culture-specific strategies that would meet the needs of families. 162
Turning to substance abuse issues, a major problem for pregnant, drug-
addicted women is the lack of Ireatment facilities.' 63 Providing treatment before
the child is born would help women with their substance-abuse problems.
Children need not be removed in order for parents to receive treatment. Child
welfare agencies and their community-based agencies can provide services such
as family and individual therapy, parenting education, and school-based services.
For example, New Hampshire is currently attempting to assess the impact of
parental substance abuse treatment on child safety and family stability by
examining where substance abuse treatment and subsequent intensive services
can support families. 164
4. Poverty and Neglect
Additional preventive services focus on providing sufficient resources so that
the family is able to support its children. Given the correlation between poverty
and involvement in the abuse and neglect system, addressing a family's financial
needs is an extremely effective method for deterring child abuse. The provision of
adequate housing165 and other resources might help to reduce the number of
neglect and abuse problems. Homelessness may serve as a basis for denying
public welfare benefits to mothers, 166 thereby exacerbating the family's poverty.
The head of the foster care system in the district of Columbia estimated that up to
fifty percent of the children in foster care could be returned to their parents, if
housing was available for them.167
States should be precluded from bringing a neglect petition based on a
family's homelessness, 168 thereby attempting to sever actual neglect from
poverty. A comparable problem occurs when mothers are forced to work outside
162 See Minow, supra note 155, at 224-52.
163 See ROBERTS, supra note 139, at 178.
164 See HHS Approves Child Welfare Reform Demonstrations for Kansas and New
Hampshire, (last modified Sept. 24, 1998 <http'//www.hhs.govnews/press/1998pres/980924.
html> (press release).
165 See Evan S. Stolove, Comment, Pursuing The Educational Rights of Homeless
Children:An OverviewforAdvocates, 53 MD. L. REV. 1344, 1356 n.100 (1994).
166 See Stanley S. Herr, Children Without Homes: Rights to Education and to Family
Stability, 45 U. MIANI L. REv. 337,343 n.28 (1996).
167 See Jason Deparle, Slamming the Door, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1996, at 52.
168 See Carl Sanger & Eleanor Willemsen, Minor Changes: Emancipating Children in
Modern Times, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 239, 342 (1992) (noting a California statute that
precludes finding a child dependent based upon the family's lack of emergency housing).
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of the home; the lack of adequate child care may also lead to neglect.169 One
Colorado jurisdiction has sought to coordinate the two aspects of child welfare,
the public aid and the abuse and neglect system. 170 Thus, for example child
welfare caseworkers have access to public welfare resources in order to support
the child's family.171
5. Child Abuse and Woman Battering
Although there is a strong nexus between adult and child domestic
violence, 172 there is often, nonetheless, a lack of coordination between the
domestic violence and child welfare systems.173 Indeed, my domestic violence
clients often felt that if they reported the violence against them to public
authorities, then their children might be removed.174 Where there has been a
report of child abuse, in determining whether to provide services or remove
children, the child welfare worker should evaluate who is doing the battering. If it
is the mother's boyfriend or another male in the household, then it may be more
appropriate to remove him than the children.175 Child welfare prevention efforts
often require support of a battered mother so that she can separate from the
batterer, 176 providing safety for both herself and her children. They also require
domestic violence and child abuse Iraining and protocols that are sensitively
integrated. For example, a local domestic violence center can provide help to
parents of children in the abuse and neglect system.
169 See White, supra note 153, at 117.
170 See generally David A. Bems & Barbara J. Drake, Combining Child Welfare and
Welfare Reform at a LocalLevel, 57 POL'Y & PRAC. PUB. HUM. SERVs. 26 (1999).
171 See id. at 29-30.
172 See, e.g., Dohm, supra note 55, at 9; see generally Mary McKeman McKay, The Link
Between Domestic Violence and Child Abuse: Assessment and Treatment Considerations, 73
CHILD WELFARE 29 (1994); Melanie Shepard & Michael Raschick, How Child Welfare
Workers Assess and Intervene Around Issues of Domestic Violence, 4 CHILD MALTREATMENT
148 (1999).
173 See Edelman, supra note 66, at 16-17 (arguing that "we need to introduce into the
child welfare context a battered woman's perspective' and providing examples ofjurisdictions
that have done so).
174 See Bonnie E. Rabin, Violence Against Mothers Equals Violence Against Children:
Understanding the Connections, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1995) ("The paradox of society's
treatment of battered women is that the word is 'out': if you~report domestic violence in your
home, your children might be removed.').
175 See V. Pualani Enos, Prosecuting Battered Mothers: State Laws' Failure to Protect
Battered Women and Abused Children, 19 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 229, 231 (1996) (arguing
"that when determining whether a woman is responsible for harm done to her child by a third
person, courts should employ an objective standard'9; Murphy, supra note 114, at 712,762.
17 6 See Murphy, supra note 114, at 763-64; see generally Martha Mahoney, Legal Images
ofBattered Women: Redefining the Issue ofSeparation, 90 MlcH. L. REv. 1 (1991);.
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B.Post-Removal
One comparatively recent innovation has been an increasing use of kinship
care, allowing relatives rather than strangers to care for children after removal.1 77
While this allows a child to maintain connections with her family, it also attempts
to ensure the safety of her familial placement 178 In fact, ASFA recommends the
use of kinship care. Children in kinship care are less likely to lie in multiple foster
home placements. While fifty-nine percent of children in nonkinship care had
only one placement, eighty-three percent of children in kinship care had only one
placement. 179 Others have suggested changing the standard for intervention such
that child protection authorities could not remove children unless placement in
foster care would be more effective than remaining in the home situation. 180
In addition, there are many other mechanisms that keep children safe without
terminating their familial ties. Where agencies can actually work with biological
families in providing needed resources, reunification becomes more feasible. In
Cleveland, through the Family-to-Family program, birth parents and foster
parents work with the child welfare agency to prepare the best long-term plan for
the child, using both community and familial support.181 One of the foster
mothers involved in this program said that she had initially believed that she
could provide better care for her foster child than could his biological mother, in
part due to her greater resources. But after watching him interact with his mother,
she knew that she could never give her foster child what his biological mother
could.182 He was in foster care for four years while the two mothers worked
together.183 Longer term foster care is not inherently a bad idea184 if it is
177 Under 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(19) (Supp. 111 1997), which was enacted as a part of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, states must now
consider giving preference to adult relatives over unrelated care providers.
178 Of course, kinship care is not perfect. In fact, the term itself is far from precise. It is
unclear whether kinship care is formalized familial care or conventional foster care placement;
this confusion is mirrored in policies surrounding such care. Indeed the term is susceptible to
many interpretations. See Berrick supra note 136, at 84; Hanson & Opsahl, supra note 136, at
483 (1996); Ross & Calm, supra note 20 (manuscript at nm.12, 74, on file with authors).
Reunification occurs more slowly in kinship care than in other types of foster care. One reason
may be the financial incentives to keep children in familial care rather than returning them. See
Berrick, supra note 136, at 81-82.
179 See NATIONAL STUDY, supra note 56, at 6-16.
180 See Braveman & Ramsey, supra note 59, at 463; Kindred, supra note 137, at 39.
181 See Barriers to Adoption, supra note 1, at 46-47 (statement of Judith Goodhand).
182 See id. at 52-53 (statement of Patricia Newell).
183 See id. at 54-55 (statement of Patricia Newell).
184 Professor Derdeyn suggests the importance of considering "a legal framework for
permanent custody with foster parents without terminating parental rights." Derdeyn, supra
note 11, at 347; cf Gordon, supra note 72, at 689 (suggesting federal disincentives to long-term
foster care in an effort to promote funding for preventive services).
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combined with a coherent and reasonable reunification plan, or if it becomes a
permanency plan itself. Particularly for older children, foster care may preserve
their sense of family and community.185 If children are placed in one foster
family, rather than being subject to multiple placements, they can develop close
relationships with both families.' 86 Early termination of parental rights can be
detrimental, especially for older children, who will not necessarily be adopted.
The termination of parents' rights also means the termination of the rights of other
relatives. 187
Where adoption is clearly warranted, there can still be a possibility of
"adoption-with-contact," or "open adoption," through which the biological parent
and child retain some connection and contact that could be legally enforceable.
That is, the adoption occurs but the biological parent can still remain in contact
with her child. A number of states have recently enacted legislation designed to
validate and enforce such open adoption agreements when both the adoptive and
biological parents have consented to the contact.188 Other states have passed
slightly different statutes that authorize a court to award post-adoption visitation
to a child's biological relatives, whenever such visitation is in the child's best
interests.1 89 The Uniform Adoption Act allows for the creation and enforcement
of adoption-with-contact orders in step-parent adoptions, even where the parties
have not agreed to permit the contact.190 The federal government's Adoption
2002 Guidelines recommend that state law allow for legally binding agreements
concerning post-adoption contact.191
185 See Gordon, supra note 72, at 667 (criticizing ASFA for its lack of sensitivity to the
age of the child in foster care).
18 6 The recognition of multiple parents or caretakers can be justified from a child's
perspective. See Gilbert A. Holmes, The 7ie That Binds: The Constitutional Right of Children
to Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 Mi. L. REv. 358, 410 (1994). For a
discussion of the concept of multiple caregivers, see Naomi R. Calm, Reframing Child Custody
Decisionmaling, 58 OHIo ST. LJ. 1, 52-54 (1997); Eleanor Willemsen & Kristin Marcel,
Attachment 101 for Attorneys: Implications for Infant Placement Decisions, 36 SANTA CLARA
L. REv. 439,468-69 (1996).
18 7 See Hand, supra note 73, at 1268 n. 97; DeMichele, supra note 81, at 757-58.
188 See, e.g., N.M. STAT ANN. § 32A-5-35 (Michie 1998); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.305
(1998). WASH. REV. CODE § 26.33.295 (1998). For a comprehensive discussion of such
legislation, see Annette Ruth Appell, Increasing Options to Improve Permanency
Considerations in Drafting an Adoption with Contact Statute, 18 CHILDREN'S LEGAL RrS. LJ.
24,36-42 (1998).
189 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 31-19-16-1 (1998); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-162 (1998); N.Y.
SOC. SERv. LAW § 383-c (Gould 1997).
190See UNIFORM ADOPTION Acr § 4-112-113 (1994); see generally Margaret M.
Mahoney, Open Adoption in Context: The Wisdom and Enforceability of Visitation Orders for
Former Parents Under the Uniform Adoption Act, 59 FLA. L. REV. 89 (1999).
191 See Donald N. Duquette et al., U.S. Dept. Health & Human Servs., Adoption 2002:
The President's Initiative in Adoption and Foster Care: Guidelines for Public Policy and State
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Open adoption is being touted as an option in the foster care context, in part
to encourage biological parents who are unable to care for a child to voluntarily
relinquish their parental rights without completely severing their connection to the
child.192 While there are various ethical issues involved in negotiating an open
adoption agreement in this context, 193 it nonetheless remains useful to consider
this alternative to complete termination of parental rights.
In other situations, perhaps the parental rights should not be terminated unless
there is a strong belief that the child will be adopted otherwise, the courts may be
cutting off children from relatives with whom they have close ties.194
The Alabama abuse and neglect system provides some ideas for improving
the system. As a result of a lawsuit forcing the social services agency to change its
practices, the consent decree specifies that the abuse and neglect system has as a
primary goal, allowing children to remain with their families of origin, so long as
they are safe.195 The child abuse and neglect agency is required to provide
intensive in-home services where this will help keep the children at home. Such
services range from accompanying a parent to an Alcoholics Anonymous
meeting to teaching parents how to help their children do homework to various
forms of counseling.196 By changing their orientation, the child abuse and neglect
workers "learned how to look beyond the often abundant negatives and engage
families in a genuine partnership by identifying their strengths."'197 If children are
removed from the home, then the new system supports contact between foster
children and their families of origin.198 In Alabama, the number of children in
foster care declined from 4,625 in 1992 to 3,650 in 1996, and the average time in
Legislation Governing Permanence for Children, at ch.2, pt.4 (last modified June 1999)
<http:/www.aef.dhhs.gov/programscb/special/02adpt2htnguidstgu>.
192 See, e.g., Appell, supra note 109, at 1013-25.
193 See Madelyn Freundlich, Adoption and Ethics: The Hard Questions, ADOPnivE FAMS.,
July/August 1999, at 8, 11 (raising questions about the fairness of using adoption-with-contact
as an inducement to biological parents' agreement to a voluntary termination of their rights).
194 Martin Guggenheim suggests that parental rights not be terminated unless: (1) there
are grounds to terminate; (2) the child's "best interests" require termination; and (3) it is not
improbable that the child will be adopted. See Guggenheim, supra note 95, at 136.
195 See R.C. v. Nachman, 969 F. Supp. 682, 682 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (rejecting motion to
vacate the consent decree); see generally BAZELON CTM. FOR MENrAL HEALTH LAW, MAKING
CHILD WELFARE WORK How THE R.C. LAwsurr FORGED NEW PARTNERSHIPS TO PROTECr
CHILDREN AND SUSTAIN FAMILIEs 22 (1998) [hereinafter MAKING WELFARE WORK].
196 See MAKING WELFARE WORK, supra note 195, at 62. Other services include helping
the parents find housing, helping the parents with vocational training, providing transportation
for children and parents, and parent training. See id.
19 7 See id. at 51-52.
198 The consent decree requires that children be allowed to contact family members, and
both the social worker and foster care provided are supposed to encourage "frequent contact"
between the child and her family. See id. at 101 app.4.
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foster care also decreased.199
Such innovative thinking presents possibilities for changing how we think
about child abuse and neglect, and provides hope for the poor children most likely
to be subject to that system. There are creative solutions that allow children to
remain safely in their families of origin.
Other states have developed initiatives that help reunify families when
appropriate. In Arizona, a Housing Assistance Program provided support for
families where housing was the primary barrier to reunification.200 As a result,
almost twelve percent of the children in foster care between 1991-95 were
reunited, and the state saved more than $1 million in foster care and related
expenses. 20 1
V. CONCLUSION
Federal policy towards foster care and adoption seems predicated on
stereotypes: stereotypes about foster care, adoption, abused and neglected
children, and mothers. It establishes dichotomies: the good mother is capable of
reforming herself within one year, or else she is a bad parent Parents and children
are adversaries in the abuse and neglect system. Foster care is bad for children, so
they need to be freed for adoption. These stereotypes have a particularly strong
impact on poor children, who are those most likely to appear in the child
protection system. Recent federal policy sacrifices children's interests in its rush
towards adoption as the solution for all abused and neglected children, rather than
focusing on the relationships of children to their families and communities.
Outside of cases involving severe abuse or neglect, family preservation-both
pre-removal and post-removal--remains the preferred solution. The origins of the
foster care system, as an effort to preserve families and allow children to stay in
their families of origin, reflects the impulse reflected throughout American law
that children belong with their parents. The disproportionate use of the abuse and
neglect system against racial minorities, and the removal of children for poverty
alone, show the dangers of not presuming family integrity.
The goals of the 1980 legislation-safety and family connection-remain in
the child's best interest. Families have strengths that can be supported so that
children are not unjustly removed. Rather than providing for only two options-
termination of parental rights and adoption or reunification-on the misguided
assumption that they can be pursued simultaneously, federal law should
encourage alternatives, such as open adoption or longer term foster care
placement. Moreover, the strict time frame during which the states must act on
199 See Courts Say Many States Fail to Protect Foster Kids, DALLAS MORNING NErs,
Mar. 17,1996, at8A.
200 See Encouraging Adoption, supra note 99, at 9-10 (statement of Mark Nadel, U.S.
General Accounting Office).
201 See id. at 9.
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termination of parental rights will have a particularly harsh effect on poor
children, who are often removed from their homes for neglect stemming from
poverty, rather than from severe abuse or neglect. Federal law should return to the
presumption that children are best cared for in their families and communities of
origin, and should include the presumption that these families deserve the support
to enable them to perform and act in the child's best interests.

